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ABSTRACT 
An Empirical Study of the Information Content and Insider Trading Around 
Open Market Share Repurchase Announcements 
Liang Feng 
This paper employs a conditional event study to analyze managers' motives to 
announce a share repurchase while at the same time exploring the factors that drive a 
firm's abnormal announcement return. We find that firms that have more free cash 
flow and less debt are more likely to initiate a repurchase. We also document that the 
market reacts more positively to announcements made by firms that exhibit poor 
pre-announcement stock price performance as well as firms that seek to buy back a 
higher percentage of shares. We do not find any significant positive correlation 
between managers' private information and unexplained abnormal returns, which 
suggests that the market's discovery of insiders' private information has already been 
incorporated into abnormal returns, or that the announcement return may be 
explained entirely by public information as predicted by the agency hypothesis. 
This study also provides complementary evidence on the information content of 
open market repurchases by analyzing insider trading activities around the repurchase 
announcements. We show that in general, insiders in repurchasing firms tend to 
decrease their selling activity and increase their buying activity before repurchase 
announcements. After the announcement, the differences in insider trading activity 
between repurchasing firms and non-repurchasing firms are largely insignificant. 
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Since the regulatory framework in the U.S. was established in 1982, share 
repurchases have become an increasingly important payout policy. As Grullon and 
Michaely (2002) suggest, in the early years of the period from 1972 to 2000, the 
dollar amount spent by U.S. firms on stock repurchases was a small fraction of that of 
dividends; however, this fraction kept rising over time. Since 1999 the dollar amount 
of share repurchases has exceeded that of dividends. 
There are three types of common stock repurchases: open-market repurchases, 
fixed-price self-tender offers, and Dutch-auction self-tender offers. Fixed-price tender 
offers specify a single purchase price, the number of shares sought, and an expiration 
date. Dutch-auction tender offers specify a range of prices within which each 
tendering shareholder chooses his or her minimum acceptable selling price. The 
offering firm assembles all of selling prices, ordering them by the shareholders' 
minimum acceptable prices, and determines the lowest price that will fetch the 
number of shares sought. This price is then paid to all shareholders who tendered 
shares at an ask-price equal to, or lower than, this price. In contrast, open-market 
repurchases do not provide shareholders with a premium and may be carried out over 
several months (and years in many cases, see Comment and Jarrell, 1991). Under this 
method, firms purchase their own stock, just as anyone would buy shares of a 
particular stock. Thus, the seller does not know whether the shares were sold back to 
the firm or just another investor (Ross et al., 2005). 
The literature is rich with motives for share repurchases. In addition, there are many 
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studies that examine abnormal returns around repurchase announcements. In this paper 
we focus our attention on the information signaling or undervaluation hypothesis, the 
excess cash distribution and dividend substitution hypothesis, and the optimal capital 
structure hypothesis. 
The signaling or undervaluation hypothesis is based on the premise that the 
informational asymmetry between insiders and shareholders may cause a firm to be 
misvalued. Under this hypothesis, firms buy back their shares to signal that their 
stocks are undervalued. Thus, repurchase announcements usually lead to an increase 
in a firm's stock price. It is hypothesized that the positive market reaction to 
repurchase announcements is consistent with the notion that repurchases are looked 
upon favorably by the market and shareholders. Dann (1981), Vermaelen (1981), and 
Dittmar (2000) discover that information signaling is the main motivation for stock 
repurchases. Also consistent with this hypothesis, Stephens and Weisbach (1998) 
reveal a negative correlation between repurchase activity and prior stock returns, 
indicating that firms buy back shares when they perceive their stock to be undervalued. 
Similarly, a number of studies have found that announcement-period stock returns are 
inversely related to prior-period returns for stock buybacks when the prior return is 
measured over a relatively short period (Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Korajczyk, Lucas, 
and McDonald, 1989; Comment and Jarrell, 1991). 
By analyzing a sample of share repurchase announcements by U.S. firms during 
the period from 1984 to 1989, Comment and Jarrell (1991) find that the 
above-mentioned three kinds of stock buybacks are on average all associated with 
significant positive excess returns. Fixed-price self-tender offers result in an average 
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excess return of about 11%, compared with under 8% for Dutch-auctions, while 
open-market repurchases induce an average excess return of about 2%, suggesting 
that open-market repurchases are the least effective signals of stock undervaluation 
because open-market repurchases expose the personal wealth of managers to less risk 
than self-tender offers. In addition, Comment and Jarrell (1991) show that firms 
employ the target repurchase proportion as a signal of the firm's future earnings. They 
find that for all types of repurchases every increase of 10 percent in the proportion of 
share sought leads to an increase of 2 percent in the announcements return. 
However, despite their reduced signaling effect, open-market repurchases are 
more popular than fixed-price and Dutch auction self-tender offers. Ikenberry 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1995) and Stephens and Weisbach (1998) report that 
open-market stock repurchases account for approximately 90% of the total dollar 
value of all stock repurchases between 1985 and 1993. Obviously, the 
information-signaling theory cannot explain the popularity of open-market 
repurchases. Comment and Jarrell (1991) argue that open-market repurchases are 
excellent vehicles for paying cash to shareholders but are not the most effective 
vehicles for signaling stock undervaluation. Consistent with the theory of rational 
choice, open market repurchases, which present the lowest risk for both firms and 
managers, are used more frequently. The popularity of open-market market 
repurchases suggests that most stock buybacks may be motivated by objectives other 
than (or in addition to) signaling stock undervaluation, such as distributing excess 
cash to shareholders and preventing hostile takeovers (Comment and Jarrell, 1991). 
Many firms select repurchases as their payout policy. This popularity is not 
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surprising: first, open market repurchases provide a flexible way of capital 
distribution without any commitment. Jensen (1986) asserts that firms repurchase 
stock to distribute excess cash flows. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Dittmar 
(2000) support this notion and find a positive relation between repurchases and levels 
of cash flow. Second, the tax rate on capital gains is lower than the tax rate on 
dividend income. At the same time, if repurchases and dividends are substitutes, then 
repurchases should be negatively related to dividend yield. However, when 
investigating the relationship between repurchasing activity and dividend payout, both 
Dittmar (2000) and Li and McNally (2007) find no support for this hypothesis. 
Another motive for repurchases is provided by the optimal capital structure 
hypothesis. Bagwell and Shoven (1989) show that firms may use stock repurchases to 
achieve their target leverage ratio. If a firm's financial leverage is below the optimal 
leverage ratio of its industry, this firm can repurchase its shares in order to increase its 
leverage ratio, and thus increase its firm value. Therefore, a firm is more likely to buy 
back shares if its leverage ratio is below the optimum leverage ratio. 
According to the signaling and undervaluation hypotheses, repurchase 
announcements reveal private information to the market on a limited scale and thus 
the abnormal announcement return should be correlated with the private information 
conveyed in the announcement. Li and McNally (2007) find that the announcement 
period returns of Canadian repurchases are strongly and positively related to the private 
information possessed by company insiders. However, Barclay and Smith (1988) and 
Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000) argue that asymmetrically informed inside shareholders 
use open market repurchases as disguised insider trading. Firms initiate repurchases 
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when their shares are undervalued, and so the repurchase transfers wealth from the 
selling shareholders to the insiders (and other non-selling shareholders). Under this 
hypothesis, the announcement signals that the firm's shares are undervalued, but the 
signal is incomplete. The market does not learn all of the insiders' private information 
from the announcement and so it continues to undervalue the firm's shares afterwards. 
In addition, Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) argue that the announcement return 
may be explained entirely by public information under the agency hypothesis. Insiders 
have the opportunity to deploy corporate resources in ways that benefit themselves but 
may not benefit outside shareholders. Repurchases may cause an abnormal 
announcement return because they reduce free cash flow and therefore reduce the 
opportunities for insiders to squander corporate resources. Isagawa (2000) argues that 
announcement returns may also reflect private information as reflected in 
management's preferences for empire building and perquisite consumption. On the 
other hand, as currently conceived in the literature, the optimal capital structure and 
dividend substitution hypotheses provide explanations for why firms repurchase, but do 
not imply that there is private information conveyed through the announcement. 
Aside from exploring the aforementioned hypotheses, we add to the extant 
literature by examining the trading behavior of insiders around repurchase 
announcements. A number of prior studies have analyzed the insider trading activities 
around share repurchases.1 Based on the information asymmetry hypothesis, insiders 
1
 The term "insiders" refers to people who have knowledge of, or access to, valuable nonpublic 
information about a corporation. Consistent with the extant literature, we consider all directors and 
officers of a company as well as the stockholders who own more than 10% of a company's stock as 
insiders. 
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exploit share repurchases to conceal insider trading (Barclay and Smith (1988) and 
Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000)). Because share repurchases transfer wealth from the 
selling shareholders to the insiders and because there tend to be significant positive 
abnormal returns around repurchase announcements, the repurchase always benefits 
insiders rather than outsiders (or the market). Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch (1992) find 
that managers of repurchasing firms increase their frequency of buying and decrease 
their frequency of selling shares prior to (especially in the six month before) repurchase 
announcements. They argue that managerial net-buying activities may be motivated by 
managers' belief that the stock is undervalued, and this belief also motivates the 
repurchase decision of the firms. Wansley, Lane and Sarkar (1989) conduct a survey 
about the motives for stock repurchases. In response to this survey, chief financial 
officers of 98 large firms pointed out that the belief that the firm's shares are 
undervalued is the most important reason for implementing a stock repurchase 
program. 
Because insiders have insight into the workings of their company, people have for 
years based their investment decisions on the actions of insiders. The market 
considers insider trading prior to stock repurchases as a complementary signal and 
takes advantage of insider trading to assess the information value of repurchase 
announcements. Hsu (1999) analyzes the information content of insider trading and 
open-market stock repurchases and finds insider-buying activities prior to 
open-market repurchase announcements to be positively related to the returns around 
the announcement, but this relation does not hold in the long run. 
6 
This paper uses conditional event study methodology to examine the motives for 
share repurchases and then inspects whether the abnormal announcement return is 
related to the private information possessed by insiders. Specifically, we contrast three 
hypotheses that explain repurchases and the announcement return: the information 
signaling or undervaluation hypothesis, the excess cash distribution and dividend 
substitution hypothesis, and the optimal capital structure hypothesis. Past studies of 
announcement returns generally employ standard event-study methodology. As Li and 
Prabhala (2005) point out, when corporate events are voluntary, like repurchase 
announcements, standard event studies will likely produce biased parameter estimates, 
whereas conditional event study methodology is free of self-selection bias. We 
follow Li and McNally (2007) who deploy conditional event study methodology to 
measure the returns around Canadian repurchase announcements. The benefit of using 
this approach is that it models both the likelihood of a repurchase and the abnormal 
return around repurchase announcements-two research questions that have generally 
been investigated separately in the previous literature. 
Moreover, while Li and McNally (2007) employ a comparatively small sample of 
repurchase announcements by Canadian firms for their study, our study will be the 
first to use a conditional event study approach for a large comprehensive sample of 
repurchase announcements by U.S. firms and to explore whether the abnormal returns 
for U.S. repurchases can be attributed to private information possessed by insiders. 
The likelihood of a repurchase is modeled as a function of publicly observable proxies 
suggested by theory and of unobservable private determinants known only to corporate 
insiders. The conditional event study approach therefore provides a direct test of the 
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correlation between the private information conveyed by the announcement and the 
abnormal announcement return. 
We find that firms that have more free cash flow and less debt are more likely to 
initiate a repurchase. This finding supports the excess cash distribution hypothesis and 
the optimal capital structure hypothesis. We also document that the market reacts 
more positively to undervalued firms, i.e. firms that exhibit poor pre-announcement 
stock price performance, that seek to buy back a higher percentage of shares. 
However, in contrast to the results of Li and McNally (2007), we do not find any 
significant positive correlation between managers' private information and the 
unexplained abnormal return. We argue that it is more likely that the market's 
discovery of insiders' private information has already been incorporated into our 
abnormal return, which is derived from the market model. Our results provide support 
for Barclay and Smith's (1988) and Ikenberry et al.'s (1995, 2000) hypothesis that the 
signals provided by repurchase announcements are incomplete, and that the market 
does not learn all of the insiders' private information from the announcement. Our 
results also support the explanation by Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) who 
suggest that the announcement return may be explained entirely by public information 
under the agency hypothesis. 
While our conditional event study directly explores the relationship between 
managers' private information and the unexplained abnormal returns, our analysis of 
insider trading activities around announcements provides complementary evidence on 
the information content conveyed by open market repurchases. Many studies have 
shown that managers employ their information advantage by trading their firms' 
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shares prior to a repurchase announcement, and that managers' trading activities 
around such announcements tend to be highly profitable when considered in light of 
the stock price change around the announcement date. Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch 
(1992) find that for fixed price tender offer repurchases, managers increase their 
frequency of buying and decrease their frequency of selling shares prior to the 
repurchase announcement, but they find no such evidence for Dutch auction offers. 
This difference suggests that managers have different motives for these two types of 
offers, which convey different information. While Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch (1992) 
examine stock repurchases made via tender offers, we focus on insider-trading 
activities around open-market repurchases. We show that, on average, insiders in 
repurchasing firms tend to decrease their selling activity and increase their buying 
activity before repurchase announcements. After the announcement, the differences in 
insider trading activity between repurchasing firms and the non-repurchasing firms 
are largely insignificant. As such, our results provide support for the findings by Lee, 
Mikkelson, and Partch (1992), and show that informed insider trading is not limited to 
tender offers but is also evident around open market repurchase announcements. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our 
sample construction process and provides preliminary results on firms' abnormal 
returns around repurchase announcements. Section 3 presents our conditional event 
study model and provides the corresponding results. Section 4 analyzes 
insider-trading activities around announcements. Finally, in Section 5, we offer 
conclusions and suggestions for future research. 
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2. Sample and data description 
2,1. Sample selection 
From the Securities Data Corporation (SDC), we obtain a complete record of 
open market repurchase programs announced by firms traded on the NYSE, AMEX, 
and NASDAQ between 1995 and 2006. Besides ruling out repurchases that are 
connected to attempts to take over or to solidify control of a firm, we also exclude all 
repurchases made by financial institutions, public utilities, and transportation 
companies (i.e. firms with one-digit SIC codes of 6 or 4, respectively) since their 
motives for repurchasing stock may differ from other firms' motives. During this 
sample period, a total of 6,398 open market repurchase programs were announced. 
For each repurchase, we collect the announcement date, the percentage of share 
buybacks initially authorized, company identification information, and the firm's SIC 
code. 
Stock returns and market returns are from the Center for Research in Securities 
Prices (CRSP), and financial accounting data is from Standard & Poor's Compustat. 
After removing firms with missing data, the number of sample firms is reduced for 
certain analyses. 
We obtain insider trading data from the Nasdaq website (www.nasdaq.com) that 
provides insider trading information from Form 4 filings with the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). Insiders are defined as officers and beneficial owners 
who are buying or selling their company's stock. A beneficial owner is a person who 
owns more than 10% of the stock, or who, directly or indirectly, through any contact, 
arrangement, understanding, and relationship or otherwise, has or shares a direct or 
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indirect pecuniary interest in the stock (www.nasdaq.com). Because of the high cost 
of gathering such data, we only include insider-trading data for the sub-sample 
between 1995 and 2001. 
Table 1 provides information on the number of repurchase announcements over the 
period from 1995 to 2006. There appears to be a cyclical trend in share repurchases. 
While the number of repurchasing announcements climbed from 1995 to 1998, it then 
descended every year during the 1999 to 2003 period, only to rise again towards the end 
of our sample period. 
***Insert Table 1 about here*** 
2.2. Matching procedure 
We match each sample firm with a Compustat-listed firm in the same industry (as 
measured by three-digit SIC codes) that is similar in firm size and market-to-book 
ratio, but has not experienced a repurchase event over the corresponding sample 
period. After eliminating the missing data, we have 1,949 sample firms and 1,928 
matched firms in our final sample. Table 2 presents a univariate comparison of firm 
characteristics for repurchasing firms and matched firms during the sample period. 
Repurchasing firms generate significantly greater cash flows of 100 million compared 
to only 80 million for matched firms. Repurchasing firms also have significantly less 
debt (0.21 percent vs. 0.31 percent). On the other hand, we find no significant 
difference in the pre-announcement dividend payout or stock returns between 
repurchasing firms and matched firms. 
***Insert Table 2 about here*** 
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2.3. Abnormal returns around repurchase announcements 
The abnormal returns are calculated by using standard event study 
methodology. Based on a simple market model, the prediction error for firm / on day t 
can be written as: 
ARu=Rtt-al-fiRm (1) 
where 
ARU = Abnormal return to firm / on day t, 
Rjt = Realized return for firm i on day t, 
a;, $ = Market model parameter estimates, and 
Rmt = Return on the equally-weighted or value-weighted CRSP market index on day t. 
Accumulating the abnormal returns over a given window [t1,t2] provides the 
cumulative abnormal return CAR; for each firm: 
CARi=fjARit (2) 
The market parameters estimates for each firm in our sample are obtained from a 
market model regression for days -280 to -26 (estimation period). Day zero (t=0) is 
defined as the repurchase announcement date. Table 3 provides the daily abnormal 
returns of repurchasing firms over the period (-20, 20). Table 4 provides the average 
cumulative abnormal returns of repurchasing firms over different intervals. The 
average cumulative abnormal return over the period (-1,1) is 2.64 percent when 
abnormal returns are derived from the market model when using the CRSP 
equally-weighted index as a market proxy and 2.39 percent when using the CRSP 
value-weighted index. These results are largely consistent with Comment and Jarrell 
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(1991) who find average abnormal returns of 2.3 percent around open market 
repurchase announcements. 
***Insert Table 3 about here*** 
***Insert Table 4 about here*** 
Figure 1 depicts our results graphically and presents cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) around repurchase announcements for our sample of 1,949 firms that 
announced a share buyback program between January 1995 and December 2006. 
Daily abnormal returns are accumulated over a period from twenty days before the 
announcement to twenty days afterwards and are derived from the market model that 
uses the CRSP equally-weighted index to proxy for market returns.2 Our results 
suggest that firms' performance prior to repurchase announcements tends to be very 
poor, with significantly negative pre-announcement returns. On the other hand, there 
is a significant increase in stock prices following the announcement of repurchases. 
Consistent with previous studies (e.g. Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Korajczyk, Lucas, 
and McDonald, 1989; Comment and Jarrell, 1991), this result implies that the 
prior-period returns over a relatively short period are inversely related to 
announcement-period stock returns. 
***Insert Figure 1 about here*** 
3. Conditional event study model 
3.1. Methodology 
2
 Our results are highly similar if we use the CRSP value-weighted index instead. 
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Following Li and McNally's (2007) methodology, we employ conditional event 
study methodology to model both the likelihood of a repurchase and a series of factors 
that explain the announcement return for U.S. open market repurchases. 
Our model is based on the premise that a company decides to repurchase stock if its 
marginal utility of repurchase, denoted by u*, is positive. We can present marginal 
utility as u = fix + e, where p is a vector of k parameters, and X is a set of firm 
characteristic variables which are public information. The error, e, can be treated as 
insiders' private information. Thus, for a repurchasing firm, it must be true that 
e > -J3X. The abnormal announcement period return for repurchasing firms can be 
presented as CAR = aY + E(e | e > -fiX), where a is a vector of/ parameters, and Y 
is a set of CAR-related explanatory variables. The correlation of e and e is denoted by 
p, and it represents the correlation between the private information of insiders and the 
abnormal announcement period returns unexplained by aY. If this correlation is 
significantly positive, we can conclude that the market learns about insiders' private 
information through the announcement 
3.2. Results 
Table 5 presents estimates for the logistic regression which explains the likelihood 
of a stock repurchase. For a given firm, the results for our 1995-2006 sample show that 
firms are more likely to repurchase if they have more free cash and less debt. This 
finding is consistent with the excess cash distribution hypothesis (Jensen, 1986; 
Stephens and Weisbach, 1998; and Dittmar, 2000) and the optimal capital structure 
hypothesis (Bagwell and Shoven, 1989). Consistent with Dittmar (2000) and Li and 
McNally (2007), the dividend payout variable is insignificant, which suggests that 
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firms are not substituting dividends for repurchases. Despite having a negative sign, the 
return variable is not statically significant, thus providing no support for the 
undervaluation hypothesis. This may be due to open-market repurchases, compared to 
tender-offer repurchases, providing the least effective signal of stock undervaluation 
because open market repurchases expose the personal wealth of managers to less risk 
than self-tender offers. As such, our results are consistent with Comment and Jarrell 
(1991) who argue that open-market repurchases are excellent vehicles for paying cash 
to shareholders but are not the most effective vehicles for signaling stock 
undervaluation, and that most stock buybacks may be motivated by objectives other 
than (or in addition to) signaling stock undervaluation. Our finding implies that 
managers may primarily decide to repurchase based on the positive impact they 
expect the announcement to have on their firms' share price since repurchases involve 
significant positive abnormal returns as we have seen in Section 2.3 (and as shown in 
our announcement return regression). In other words, it appears likely that managers 
take advantage of the information asymmetry that exists between themselves and 
outside investors and announce a stock repurchase program to increase their firms' 
stock price by conveying a false signal of undervaluation to the market. In addition to 
the full-sample results, Table 5 provides results for the 1995-2000 and 2001-2006 
sub-sample respectively. The sub-periods results are qualitatively similar to those for 
the whole sample, offering a robustness check for our whole sample results, and 
suggesting that our results are largely unaffected by such coinciding events as the 
extraordinary market runup from 1998 to 2000. 
***Insert Table 5 about here*** 
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Table 6 presents the results of an announcement return regression for our sample 
of 1,663 firms that made a repurchase announcement between January 1995 and 
December 2006. The dependent variables are the cumulative abnormal returns over 
the period (-1, 1) in column 1, (-1, 2) in column 2, and (-2, 2) in column 3, 
respectively. In each regression, we use the return on the CRSP equally-weighted 
index as a proxy for market return in our CAR calculation.3 For all CARs, the 
coefficient of the return variable is significantly negative, implying that abnormal 
announcement returns are higher for firms that experienced poor stock price 
performance prior to the announcements and may thus be perceived by insides as 
being undervalued. 
All CARs are positively related to percentage of shares sought. This finding is 
consistent with Comment and Jarrell (1991), who find that for all types of repurchases 
the proportion of share sought is positively related to the announcement return. 
Because the percentage of shares sought at the announcement is considered a sign of 
the extent of undervaluation perceived by managers, the market reacts positively with 
higher returns to firms that seek to repurchase a higher percentage of shares. The last 
row of Table 6 presents the correlation coefficients between the residuals of our 
abnormal announcement return regression and the residual of the logistic regression 
presented in Table 5. The correlation is not statistically significant for any CAR. This 
means that the market does not learn about the private information of managers from 
their decision of repurchase. Our results provide support for Barclay and Smith (1988) 
and Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000) who argue that the signal provided by a repurchase 
3
 Our results are highly similar if we use the CRSP value-weighted index instead. 
16 
announcement is incomplete, and that the market does not learn about all of the 
insiders' private information from the announcement. Our results also support the 
argument by Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) who assert that the announcement 
return may be explained entirely by public information. Our findings are different 
from the results of Li and McNally (2007) who find a significantly positive 
correlation between these residuals for Canadian open market repurchases. However, 
their daily abnormal return estimate is based on each firm's daily stock return less the 
TSX 300 index return; in other words, they use market-adjusted returns to calculate 
their abnormal returns. In contrast, our abnormal return measurement which employs 
the market model that adjusts for each firm's beta should capture a firm's abnormal 
performance more accurately and more completely than market-adjusted returns do. 
As a result, it is likely that the market's knowledge about insiders' private information 
has already been incorporated into our abnormal return measure. A simple market 
adjustment on the other hand is not accurate enough to provide for a proper reflection 
of this information. 
***Insert Table 6 about here*** 
4. Insider trading activities 
4.1. Measures of insider trading 
To further examine the undervaluation hypothesis and the potential presence of 
insiders' private information about the true value of their firm (as well as the 
impending repurchase announcement the firm plans to make), we analyze insider 
17 
trading activities that occurred from 180 calendar days before the repurchase 
announcement to 180 days after the announcement. Within this timeframe, we 
consider various subperiods over which we measure insider trading. Insider trading 
activities can be measured in several different ways. In this paper, we report the 
proportion of firms with insider sale and purchase transactions, the number of insider 
sale and purchase transactions per firm, and the number of shares purchased and sold by 
insiders during each event window. In addition, we report the net sale activities, i.e. 
sales minus purchases, during each interval. On a transaction basis, we define the 
number of net sales as the number of sale transactions minus the number of purchase 
transactions by insiders during each interval. Similarly, with respect to the number of 
shares traded, we define net sales as the number of shares sold minus the number of 
shares purchased by insiders in each period. If in a particular interval the number of 
shares sold by insiders is greater than the number of shares purchased by insiders for a 
firm, we classify this firm as having net sales during this period. By comparing these 
measures between repurchasing and matched (non-repurchasing) firms, we can 
evaluate whether insiders indeed engage in informed trading prior to and after a 
repurchase announcement. 
4.2. Evidence on insider trading 
Table 7 shows insider trading activities around stock repurchase announcements 
for repurchasing firms in the period from 1995 to 2001. Our results consistently 
suggest that insider sales (measured as the percentage of firms with sale transactions 
by insiders, the mean number of sale transactions by insiders per firm, and the mean 
18 
number of shares sold by insiders) decrease prior to the repurchase announcement. In 
contrast, insider purchases (as reflected by all measures) increase during the same 
period. As a result, we find that our net sale variables show a clear declining trend 
both on a quarterly basis, i.e. from (-180, 90) to (-90, 0), and on a monthly basis, i.e. 
over the intervals (-90, -60), (-60, -30), and (-30, 0). The weekly data, presented for 
the four weeks prior to and after the announcement, suggest no clear short-term trends, 
although we still find that insiders sell shares less frequently in the last two weeks 
prior to the announcement ((-14, -7) and (-7, 0)) than during the preceding two weeks 
((-28, -21) and (-21, -14)). This trend is accompanied by a concurrent short-term 
increase in purchasing activity. After repurchase announcements, we don't find any 
perceptible patterns in insider trading. 
***Insert Table 7 about here*** 
Table 8 presents information on insider trading activities for matched 
non-repurchasing firms. For comparability, we use the repurchase announcement date 
of the repurchasing firm as the announcement date for the corresponding matched 
firm. Our results for matched firms neither suggest any significant difference 
between purchasing and selling activity nor any time series patterns. 
***Insert Table 8 about here*** 
Table 9 compares insider trading activities between repurchasing firms and 
matched firms. Although not significant in every event window, we find that there is 
significantly greater net selling activity among insiders of repurchasing firms in the 
long term (e.g. during the (-180, -90) and (-90, -60) periods), followed by a reversal, i.e. 
significantly less net selling activity in repurchasing firms relative to matched firms in 
19 
the short term immediately prior to repurchasing announcements. For example, the 
number of purchase transactions exceeds the number of sale transactions by an average 
of 0.17 per firm during the one-month period prior to the repurchasing announcements, 
whereas there are 0.74 more sales than purchases for matched firms during the same 
period. The tendency for insiders to purchase rather than sell shares prior to a 
repurchasing announcement is even more evident when examining weekly trading data 
during the last four weeks prior to the announcement, where matched firms continue to 
engage in net sales while repurchasing firms display significant net purchasing activity 
when measured either on a transaction basis (number of purchase and sale transactions) 
or on a traded share basis (number of shares purchased and sold).4 After repurchase 
announcements, we do not find any noticeable differences in insider trading activities 
between repurchasing firms and matched firms except that in the intervals (21, 28), (0, 
30), (60, 90), and (0, 90), the number of net sale transactions for repurchasing firms is 
significantly smaller than for matched firms, suggesting that insiders may expect the 
firm's repurchasing activities to have a positive long-term affect on the firm's share 
price performance and are thus more inclined to hold on to their shares. 
***Insert Table 9 about here*** 
Overall, our results imply that insiders tend to decrease selling activity and 
increase buying activity before repurchase announcements. As a result, when 
compared to matched firms, insiders of repurchasing firms display decreased net 
selling behavior. The difference is especially obvious during the three weeks prior to 
4
 We attribute the tendency of matched firm insiders to engage in net selling to the fact that share 
repurchases are more frequent in market and industry declines than during bullish market conditions. 
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the announcement. Finally, after the announcement, there is somewhat limited 
evidence that suggests that insiders in repurchasing firms raise their outlook about 
their firms. 
***Insert Table 10 about here*** 
***Insert Table 11 about here*** 
Table 10 provides the results for a regression of net insider selling activity in 
repurchasing and matched firms against the same set of explanatory factors we used in 
our repurchase and announcement return regression in Tables 5 and 6. Our dependent 
variable is a net sale dummy, which is equal to one if a firm exhibits net insider 
selling during a given period, and zero otherwise. In the interval (-30, 0), (-14, -7), (-7, 
0), (21, 28), (0, 30), and (0, 90), repurchasing firms experience less net selling activity 
by insiders than matched firms. Table 11 presents the results for a similar regression 
model in which we employ the number of net sold shares, defined as the number of 
shares sold by insiders minus the number of shares bought by insiders, as a dependent 
variable. Our results for this regression model are similar to those in Table 10 and 
suggest that the coefficient on our Repurchase variable is only significantly in the 
short-term. In particular, we observe a significantly negative coefficient for this 
variable during the intervals (-21,-14) and (-14, -7) while this variable is insignificant 
during longer periods. Table 10 and Table 11 imply that approximately one month 
before their repurchase announcements, repurchasing firms display less net sale 
activity than matched firms, i.e. that insiders actively acquire or hold on to their shares, 
thus benefiting from the post-announcement stock price increase. Our results are 
similar to the findings by Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch (1992) who show that managers 
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increase their frequency of buying and decrease their frequency of selling shares prior 
to repurchase announcements involving fixed price tender offers. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper employs a conditional event study to analyze managers' motives to 
announce a share repurchase while at the same time exploring the factors that drive a 
firm's abnormal announcement return. We find that firms that have more free cash 
flow and less debt are more likely to initiate a repurchase. This finding supports the 
excess cash distribution hypothesis and the optimal capital structure hypothesis - two 
theoretical explanations for share repurchases that have so far enjoyed at best mixed 
empirical support in the extant literature. We also document that the market reacts 
more positively to undervalued firms that exhibit poor pre-announcement stock price 
returns and seek to buy back a higher percentage of shares. We do not find any 
significant positive correlation between managers' private information and the 
unexplained abnormal return. We argue that it is more likely that the market's 
discovery of insiders' private information has already been incorporated into our 
abnormal return, which is derived from the market model. Our results provide support 
for Barclay and Smith (1988) and Ikenberry et al. (1995, 2000) who argue that the 
signal provided by repurchase announcements is incomplete. Our findings also 
support the explanation by Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) who suggest that the 
announcement return may be explained entirely by public information under the agency 
hypothesis. 
This study further provides complementary evidence on the information content 
22 
of open market repurchases by analyzing insider trading activities around repurchase 
announcements. We show that in general, insiders in repurchasing firms tend to 
decrease their selling activity and increase their buying activity before repurchase 
announcements. After the announcement, the differences in insider trading activities 
between repurchasing firms and non-repurchasing firms are largely insignificant. Our 
results thus provide supplementary support for Lee, Mikkelson, and Partch (1992) 
who show that managers increase their frequency of buying and decrease their 
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
We provide information on the distribution of repurchase announcements over our 
sample period. The first column lists the years in our sample period. The second column 
provides a yearly breakdown of the number of repurchase announcements made in the 
U.S. between January 1995 and December 2006, as provided by the Securities Data 
Company (SDC) database (now administered by Thomson Financial). The third and forth 
column list the number of repurchase announcements that we use in our motivation 
regression and our CAR estimation, respectively. In these later samples, we exclude 
firms which have incomplete or missing data entries in Compustat and CRSP. 
All repurchase Repurchases in Repurchases in 

















































Total 6,398 1,949 1,663 
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Table 2: Univariate comparison of repurchasing firms and matched firms 
We provide a univariate comparison of our sample of 1,949 repurchasing firms with a 
sample of 1,928 comparable non-repurchasing firms that are matched based on industry 
(3-digit SIC codes), size, and book-to-market ratios. FreeCash is the free cash flow in the 
preceding year measured in billions of dollars. DivPayout is calculated as the sum of all 
cash dividends over net income in the preceding year. Return is the one-year total return 
on the company's common stock during the preceding year. Debt is the ratio of total debt 
over total capital in the preceding year. Tests of differences are provided in the last two 
columns and include the p-value for a t-test of differences in means and a p-value for a 
Wilcoxon test of difference in medians. 
Tests of differences 



























Mean Median St Dev 
FreeCash 0.10 0.01 0.49 
DivPayout 0.08 0.00 1.20 
Return 0.32 0.12 1.17 
Debt 0.21 0.11 0.30 
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Table 3: Daily abnormal returns of repurchasing firms 
This table provides information on the daily abnormal returns of repurchasing firms 
during a period of 20 days before and after the repurchase announcement. The sample 
includes 1,949 firms that made repurchase announcements between 1995 and 2006. The 
symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 























































































































































































































Table 4: Average cumulative abnormal returns of repurchasing firms 
This table provides information on the cumulative abnormal returns of repurchasing 
firms over various time windows during a period of 20 days before and after the 
repurchase announcement. The sample includes 1,949 repurchase announcements made 
between 1995 and 2006. The symbols $, *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 


















































































Table 5: Logistic regression of repurchasing likelihood 
This table presents the results for a logistic regression that explains a firm's likelihood of 
making a repurchase announcement. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that 
equals to one if the firm made a repurchase announcement during our sample period and 
zero otherwise, i.e. it differentiates between repurchasing firms and matched non-
repurchasing firms. Column 1 presents the regression results for our entire sample from 
1995 to 2006, i.e. for our whole sample of 1,949 repurchasing firms and 1,928 matched 
non-repurchasing firms. Column 2 presents the results for a subsample from 1995 to 
2000, while the last column provides the subsample results for the second half of our 
sample period, i.e. from 2001 to 2006. FreeCash is the free cash flow in the preceding 
year measured in billions of dollars. DivPayout is calculated as the sum of all cash 
dividends over income in the preceding year. Return is the one-year total return on the 
company's common stock during the preceding year. Debt is the ratio of total debt over 

























































Table 6: Announcement return regression 
This table presents the results of an announcement return regression for our sample of 
1663 firms that made a repurchase announcement between January 1995 and December 
2006. The dependent variables are the cumulative abnormal returns over the period (-1, 
1) in column 1, (-1, 2) in column 2, and (-2, 2) in column 3, respectively. In each 
regression, we use the return on the CRSP equally weighted index to proxy for market 
returns in our CAR calculations. FreeCash is the free cash flow in the preceding year 
measured in billions of dollars. DivPayout is calculated as the sum of all cash dividends 
over income in the preceding year. Return is the one-year total return on the company's 
common stock during the preceding year. Debt is the ratio of total debt over total capital 
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Figure 1: Cumulative abnormal return of repurchasing firms over the window (-20,20) 
This figure presents cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around repurchase 
announcements for our sample of 1,663 firms that announced a share buyback program 
between January 1995 and December 2006. Daily abnormal returns are accumulated over 
a period from twenty days before the announcement to twenty days afterwards and are 




















Days around announcement 
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